Crowdsourcing & Crowdfunding a Presidential Election

Veikko Eranti (University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences, veikko.eranti@helsinki.fi) &
Juho Lindman, Hanken School of Economics, Faculty of Information Systems,
juho.lindman@hanken.fi).

Abstract

The 2008 United States presidential election won by Barack Obama offers an interesting global benchmark on how to organize an electoral campaign. Local contextual variation exists in how social media changes organizing in electoral campaigns. In this article, we focus on one of the copycat campaigns: the Finnish 2012 presidential elections and at the campaign of Mr. Pekka Haavisto (The Greens candidate). More specifically, we are interested in the organization and funding of the campaign. The paper is a case-study based on several data sources and methods. As was evident with the Obama campaigns, a social media campaign builds on generic positive messages. For Obama, those were "hope" and "change", for Haavisto "change" and "future". These kinds of campaigns thus have a new dynamic, that we describe. Our results describe a power shift: from professionalized and mediatized electoral campaigns that are tightly controlled by party organizations to open-ended social media campaigns, where themes and campaign materials are created by independent yet often professional volunteers.

Keywords: Social media, Politics, Politics 2.0, Political organizations, Political communication, political campaigning.

1. Introduction

Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding, along with networking and organization made possible by social be open, collaborative, and get funding primary via micro-donations. These developments also change the structure and themes of these campaigns. The model for these kind of crowdsourced campaigns is the 2008 US presidential campaign of Barack Obama, which changed popular beliefs on the limits of crowdfunding and harnessing self organizing volunteers as a campaign resource (Kreiss 2012).

Citing the Obama campaign as a counterexample to a larger trend, Vergeer (2012) notes that the advent of social media has not actually changed power structures and relations between different media and their usage in electoral campaigning. This is echoed in Strandberg (2013), who shows that in a recent Finnish general election, social media didn't have a decisive role in the voting patterns of citizens. Social media and blogs do, however, hold enormous potential for decentralizing both campaign communications and intra-party power structure (Gibson et al. 2013). At the same time,the crowdsourced nature of social media makes total control of the image of a candidate impossible (Johnson & Perlmutter 2010).

In this paper we ask what happens when an electoral campaign uses social media not as an online replacement for traditional media, but rather as an organizing principle? How does this affect the organization and the roles of the participants in the campaigning? What special skills become valuable in this kind of campaign?

Empirically we look at the 2012 presidential campaign of Pekka Haavisto (Greens) in Finland, which used social media as it's main organization and funding tool. We construct the case-study through key-person interviews, electoral funding records and take a look at the social media content produced by the campaign actors. We argue that if crowdsourcing and crowdfunding are employed at the heart of a campaign, they have a profound effect on the organization, power structure and participants of the campaigns. Most popular campaign material, all television advertisements and over 85% of funding of the campaign came through a self-organizing group

of volunteers, most of whom used social media for organization. We call this freely organizing group of individual projects a rhizome (Deleuze & Quattari 1987).

The Finnish political system is party-oriented, with most important decisions usually made within the party organization. In Haavisto's campaign, the party organization stepped back, opting instead to create a somewhat empty canvas for co-operation. The candidate Haavisto was constructed as a floating signifier (Laclau & Mouffe 1985), a positive image without many political positions. Since the creation of campaign materials was left for the most par for the individuals who were volunteering on their own basis, campaign staff could not force a certain style or limits for the materials produced. They rather focused on creating the "DNA'' of the campaign in a way that made it easy for self-organizing groups of volunteers to adapt and create their own material, both thematically and visually. It would have been both impossible and impractical for the campaign team to try exercise stern oversight over all the memes and materials produced by thousands of volunteer during the campaign.

2. Background: The Obama Effect and reflexive networked individuals

In the 2008 US democratic primary, Barack Obama raised over 200 million dollars in micro-donations (Federal Election Commission 2013)[1]. The campaign site My.BarackObama.com asked for voters to register and offered a set of tools to network with other voters and independently participate in campaigning. The campaign pages also actively supported fundraising. The campaign team had a dedicated analytics team for soliciting micro-donations through the internet (Kreiss 2012, barackobama.com.)

---

[1]   We define micro-donations as singular donations under 200 dollars.

The Obama campaign was hugely influenced by an earlier American democratic primary campaign, that of Howard Dean in 2004. The two campaigns used similar tactics in both crowdfunding and using then-nascent social media in organizing, and many Obama key players had worked on the Dean campaign (Kreiss 2012, Hindman 2005).

The Obama campaign was able to both have a huge number of volunteers in a traditional sense, but also to spark a creative interest in a big crowd of online activists, creating blogposts, videos and even fan-art sold on internet auctions (Alexander 2010). A lot of choices, data-driven decision-making and strategic planning was behind the spontaneous participation of citizens in the campaign. The personnel responsible for the internet campaign had similar positions and power in the formal campaign headquarters as those responsible for communication and fundraising. Their motto was "Money, Mobilization, Message". (Kreiss 2012).

A global historical trend in party organization has been the development from mass participation towards a professionally run, professional-employing campaign machine, geared at winning mediatized elections (Duverger 1967, Epstein 1979, Mancini 1999, Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, Negrine 2007, Moring & Mykkänen 2012). The latter is certainly a good description of the Obama campaign, even with the additional social media elements.

In a fragmented and social digital media environment, the visibility of politicians and possibilities for self-organizing are changed in permanent ways (Dahlgren 2005, Johnson & Perlemutter 2010, Foot 2006). Measuring a predefined set of practices (Gibson & Römmele 2009) or allocated resources (Moring et al 2011) as a proxy for development of campaign tactics, or only measuring followers, likers and how many a voter got information about elections through social media (esp. in Finnish elections, see Strandberg 2009, 2012, 2013 & Borg 2009, 2011) as a proxy for social media effectiveness no longer seems adequate.

Häyhtiö and Rinne have proposed (2007) that politics is becoming a chain of individual acts by people rather than a struggle of ideologies or political actors. They call this kind of political activity based on identity, hobbies and other personal interests as reflexive politics and perceive it as an opposition to electoral organization.

The Obama campaign has shown that professional campaigns too can leverage these kind of reflexive individuals. However, the quality of these individuals also matters. Despite an

overabundance of cheap, easy to use media production tools, effective campaigning on social media cannot rely only on unskilled amateurs (Rinne 2011). The viral nature of social media means that the most popular content item (eg. a video on Youtube) might receive hundreds times the views of a less successful item.

3. Methodology

The internet and social media play a pivotal role in current electoral campaigns. They also provide a rich source of material for research. We collected empirical material from different internet primary sources (including social media) for the article. However, we chose not to conduct a systematic virtual etnographic study (see for example Isomäki et al., 2013). Instead this research was carried out as a qualitative case study. Our intent was to describe rich empirical material and to use it to theorize on the impacts of social media to the campaigns. Case studies are at their best when investigating explorative settings, when the boundaries of the research object are fluid or difficult to determine beforehand or when combining several different types of empirical research data (Yin, 1984, 23, Eisenhardt,1989).

We use different material distributed through the social media: photos, Youtube-videos, web pages, chats and other virtual conversations and complement these with key-person interviews. The viral part of the campaign was composed of multiple independent campaign groups and projects that had different levels of engagement with the official campaign, which sets limits to our presentation here.

We approached the material as a thematic collection centered around the Haavisto campaign, inspired by the concept of Web Sphere by Schneider and Foot (2005, 2004, Foot 2006). A Web sphere is defined as a *"set of dynamically defined digital resources spanning multiple web sites deemed relevant or related to a central event, concept or theme, and often connected by hyperlinks. The boundaries of a web sphere are delimited by a shared topical orientation and a temporal framework."* (Schneider & Foot 2005)

We also applied key person interviews to gain deeper understanding of the campaign dynamics. In total we conducted (7) interviews to complement other material. We interviewed personnel from the campaign group and officials of the Green Party. In addition to official campaigners, we

included informants who participated mainly through independent activity groups of social media. The interviews were carried out as open theme interviews and took place after the campaign. We use pseudonyms that describe a respondent role in the campaign. Interviews focused on social media use, the organizing that took place in social media and on mapping the different internal tensions in the campaign. Thus, in addition to describing the core ideas of the official campaign, we use the interview data to show four examples of these individual campaign projects.

We also use a book *President of Hearts* (Kämppi & Lähde 2012). The book, co-authored by Haavisto's campaign manager, describes how the Haavisto campaign team saw the campaign, its organization, and the core assumptions behind some key choices. Other relevant secondary material as well as the authors' own experience with people who participated to the campaign trail and in social media was also taken into consideration.

From this material, we aim at creating a cohesive holistic description of the Haavisto campaign, focusing on the use of social media, organizing and the distribution of power and control between the different actors of the campaign.

To make sense of the material we first build on the theoretical discussion on professionalisation and map the structure of the campaign as a rhizome (Deleuze & Quattari 1987). Deleuze & Quattari define a rhizome as a non-hierarchical, diverse and freely-connecting version of the network. They describe a rhizome as being free from the predefined hierarchy always present in the traditional tree-models of network. For the current work, a central point of the rhizome is that the relations between the nodes of the network, the relative size and impact of the nodes, and the possible links between different nodes are not predefined, but evolve dynamically in time, through the actions of actors (see also eg. Carpenter 2007 for other analytical uses of rhizome in relatively comparative contexts).

This article discusses changes in electoral politics. We do not aim to build a general and normative model on how social media campaigns should be organized or how to win elections.

4 Pekka Haavisto campaign

Finland has a strong multi-party parliamentary political system, with the prime minister being the most powerful politician. The Prime Minister leads a coalition government, and has in the 2000s without exceptions been the leader of the biggest party in the parliament. In 2000, a constitutional change stripped the President of the republic of most of the office's previous powers. The president is still nominally in charge of foreign policy. Mostly the position of the president is a symbolic one. This change hasn't yet reflected on the voting habits of Finns. Up until the new constitution, the President was the single most powerful politician in Finland - with the ability to disband either the government or parliament at will. Thus, voter turnout in presidential elections is a lot higher than in other local or national elections. So even without being the most politically significant office in Finland, the interest and public debate surrounding the elections is unparalleled. (Raunio 2004).

Beginning with the election of Urho Kekkonen in 1956 until the election of 2012, the presidential office was held by the agrarian Center party (1956-81) or the social democrats (1981-2012). The Green Party, which was established in 1987, had their highest ratings in presidential elections so far in 2006, with Ms. Heidi Hautala gaining 3.5 percentage of the vote. Finland has a two-tier presidential election, with all but the two leading candidates eliminated on the first round, followed with two weeks of campaigning and a second round of voting.

Ultimately, the 2012 presidential race was won by mr. Sauli Niinistö, from the center-right National Coalition party, with 62.6 % share of the vote. The National Coalition Party had better resources, and having acted as the party leader and minister of Finance for 8 years, mr. Niinistö was better known politician. This was mr. Niinistö's second presidential run, with the previous one in 2006 ending in a narrow defeat to ms. Tarja Halonen. The Niinistö campaign had a budget of over 2 million euros, over twice that of Haavisto's (Ministry of Justice, 2012).

The Haavisto campaign was based on self-organizing autonomous campaigning groups with little or no oversight from the main campaign office. Groups used memes, organized Flashmobs, produced television commercial and created all of the most visible material of the campaign. 80% of all funding came through a micro-funding tool. These groups organized mainly using Facebook and Twitter, and spread their material via social media. Many groups were originally

loosely based on previously existing networks, but grew to include other interested individuals during the elections.

Mr. Haavisto, coming from a Green party with a support, in general elections, of around 9%, was the first openly homosexual candidate in Finnish presidential elections. Despite major disadvantages in the levels of funding and campaign staff, Haavisto was able to come in second out of 8 contenders, with 37.4 % of the vote. This would not likely have been possible with a more traditional campaign design.

The campaign organization was organized separately from the Green party. This was done in accordance of the campaign professionalization thesis (Römmele & Gibson 2009). The Green Party gave the campaign organization basic staffing and meager resources. Also the officials in the party office used most their time prior to the elections volunteering for the campaign. (interview, Party Official).

From the beginning, the campaign was built around social media. The advertising, campaign organization and mobilization were done primarily online. The Haavisto campaign managed to collect over 600 000 euros through micro donations. This is a clear record in Finland, and amounts to 80% of the total campaign budget. (Haavisto campaign website 2012, Solid Angle 2012 and interviews, Campaign Manager, Ad Man)

"Pekka is a great person" - official and non-official organizing

During the campaigning, the campaign headquarters coordinated and managed the election campaign, handled all the official advertisement and strategic marketing communication as well as took care of the coherence of the campaign. Its role also included the production of material to be used by local groups, media management and coordinating the movements of the candidate. It was agreed at the outset that all transfers of funds would go through the support organization of the campaign headquarters and thus remain independent of Green party control. All the big decision would be made primarily by the campaign headquarters. (Interviews, Ad Man, Campaign Manager)

Social media was a key component of the campaign since the beginning. "The b*asic idea was that due to lack of resources we had to focus on cheap and effective means offered by social*

media, to collect a substantial part of the budget via crowdfunding and to cut budget on expensive forms of campaigning such as television and streetvisibility" (Campaign Manager). This became visible when the funds were allocated: the Haavisto campaign used almost 8% of it's total budget on targeted Facebook-advertising, which was described as "*substantial investment, one of a kind in Finland*" (interview, ad man. For analysis of the Haavisto Facebook page, see Poutanen et al 2012). Advertisement was targeted based on geographical location, age and gender in social media.(Ad man, Campaign Manager).

After the decision to focus on social media was made, it was clear that the main message of the campaign needs to be simple. This aim was reinforced by the nature of the presidential election: when voters vote for individuals in the election, it is natural to advertise the individuals. *"Our main message was that Pekka [Haavisto] was a great person"* (kampanjapäällikkö). *"Nowadays it is difficult to advertise, young people feel that it is not genuine. Instead you need a good story"*, as the effort was described by a professional who participated to campaign planning (Interview, Wordsmith.)

The goal of the campaign was to get Haavisto to the second round of the election. This was a change in campaign tactics: previous green candidates had been in the race mostly to create media visibility for the Green party as a whole and for environmental issues as such. (Kämppi ja Lähde 2012, 23). This was reflected in the whole campaign: it was created image-first. The motif of the campaign was that Mr. Haavisto is a respected, well-loved and capable peace builder. As noted earlier, Haavisto was constructed as a politically floating signifier (Laclau & Mouffe 1985), representing everything good, progressive and liberal, with almost no clear political issues. This is similar to what Alexander (2010) refers to as crafting Obama as the symbolical representation of America.

The fundraising of the Haavisto campaign was planned very carefully. The campaign manager was a professional fundraiser[2] "*I did not have any problem to formulate messages to serve the purpose of people donating money for the campaign" (*Campaign Manager). Headquarters also

---

[2]   A rarity in Finland.

planned on ordering their own gallup-questions, but they ran out funds. Instead, volunteers analysed the data provided by social media and Google. (Campaign Manager)

In the 2007/2008 primary, the Obama campaign decided to not to engage in negative campaigning or mud-slinging at all. One campaign staffer was nearly fired because of a blog post that slightly critical towards an opponent. (Kreiss 2012, 135-138). This policy was adopted by the Haavisto campaign. *"We are for Haavisto, not against anyone"* was a common motto. This made the decentralization of the control of the communications easier: as everybody was on board in praising their own candidate, fatal blunders were harder to come by.

The Haavisto team aimed at building "*a campaign bigger than its size*" (Ad Man). The campaign was meant to spread in social media and be built by volunteers. A deliberate choice was made, not to try to control all the communications through the campaign office. A centralized approach would have diminished the possibilities of the volunteers. It would have made it harder for the volunteers to produce "real" authentic viral material, which is always easier to spread. (Interview, Wordsmith, Ad Man, Campaign Manager)

 By effectively making the political message in the campaign empty, the campaign organization gave every volunteer participant the permission to insert their own political messages. This, in effect, allowed individual political campaigns to be sprouted under the common umbrella, using common visual identity and benefitting a common goal. This gave space to reflexive participation (Häyhtiö & Rinne 2007).

The projects varied in shape and size. From Haavisto theme-days in local libraries to huge arena concerts, from small flashmobs to hugely popular websites. What they all had in common was a positive core message, in accordance to the official campaign, and the use of social media to spread the word and organize things. A large part of the energy and effort put in to the campaign was channelled through these smaller projects. (Lehtopelto 2012). Most of these were autonomous both from the official campaign crew and the party office.

"Haavisto plays dubstep" - a free-flowing online organization

Next we will present four examples of free-flowing and self-organising campaign groups and describe how they contributed to the general campaign and how they used the floating signifier

of "Haavisto" in their project. The groups were born through social media, some based on existing connections, some during the campaign. The four projects are 1) The Miracle Makers, who focused on crowdfunding advertisements that complemented the official advertising strategy, 2) The Pekka Male Voice Choir, whose video "Flashmob Finlandia" ended up being used as the only official TV ad of the campaign, 3) Siksipekka.fi and kakkonenoykkönen.fi ("thatswhyPekka.fi"), websites which functioned as their own shadow campaign, soliciting micro-donations, creating memes and spreading more raucous campaign material. The three projects built on the general visual layout and supported the fundraising of the general campaign. They were also rather professional and ambitious in scope. Many smaller, more spontaneous groups also sprang up in addition to these huge and professional projects. As an example of these more personal projects, we present 4) Pekka Plays Acid and Pekka Plays Dubstep, two electronic music videos made by a politically non-active Youtube user.

The Miracle Makers

The official campaign decided to skip radio advertisement completely. A former Haavisto parliamentary aide was dissatisfied with this decision and decided to take action. He formed a working group and collected micro-donations through Facebook to buy advertisement time from the Spotify streaming service. After a successful funding drive they independently and without approval or oversight from the official campaign produced a 30 second ad that was later broadcasted also on a national mainstream music channel. (Interview, Miracle Maker)

The ad referenced an earlier Finnish presidential race with mr. Kekkonen. In the end, there was a clear message: "This advertisement was paid by private supporters of mr. Haavisto. We want to participate in the making of new history for Finland. You too can come along and make miracles. Visit our Facebook-page and come sunday, vote number 2. (Ihmeidentekijät 2012)

The group decided to call themselves the Miracle Makers and organised around a Facebook page. The ad hoc nature of the project is finely illustrated in the legal grey area of their initial fundraising. Since the project was started by individuals only couple of days before the first round of the election, donations were initially just deposited on a private bank account owned by the main organizer. In a matter of days it was decided that the project was going to be more than just a one-time operation. This required increasing professionalism, sorting out the money transfer protocol and recruiting more volunteers. All in all, they were able to raise over 50

thousand euros, which amounts to over 8% of the total campaign budget. The money was spent on advertising in local newspapers and other media that the official campaign neglected. The targets were chosen using the poll function of the Facebook group. The group contained media professionals, graphic designers, video editing professionals and so on, who then produced the ads. All ads were done without connection to the official campaign office. (Interview, Miracle Maker.)

"The official campaing organization told us to do our thing and not to keep them informed. We were pretty confident in producing the ads. Many of us also had roles in the official campaign and had worked with mr. Haavisto earlier."(Interview, the miracle maker.)

Flashmob Finlandia

Flashmob Finlandia was arguably one of the most visible single events of the campaign. It was conducted by the ad hoc Pekka Male Voice Choir and a video of the performance was uploaded on Youtube. The video begins with the everyday bustle of the Helsinki Railway Station. One man starts singing the opening lines of Jean Sibelius' Finlandia Hymn, a national romantic choir piece that functions as the unofficial second national anthem of Finland. The lyrics of the song are about how tiny Finland has finally made itself known throughout the world and how now the day of Finland is, after a long dark night, finally dawning.

One by one, additional voices from the crowd join the singer. The video shows the astonished faces of innocent bystanders. At the beginning of the second verse, a conductor appears. Then, as the song reaches it's climax, it is sung in four voices by almost 50 singers. The whole thing is done flashmob-style, with vignettes of surprised onlookers and passers-by. When the song ends, the choir dissolves in the flow of people in the station. The clip ends with men with umbrellas forming the number 2, photographed from above, and fades to a single word, Haavisto. (Flashmob Finlandia 2012)

The clip was made for Youtube, and gathered a respectable number of viewings (350 000 during the time of writing). Originally, the Haavisto campaign had decided against doing television advertising due to lack of funding. However, during the last days of the second round, micro-donations were still pouring in. The Haavisto campaign manager decided to use the flashmob video as only the official advertisement of the campaign. They contacted the choir, asked for

permissions to use the video, and the two-and-half-minute video was broadcasted in national TV the day before elections. (Kämppi & Lähde 2012, pp. 250-255.)

The Pekka Male Voice Choir was formed a couple of days before the flashmob. It consisted of politically active (or at least interested) male choir enthusiasts. The backbone of the singers was recruited through Ylioppilaskunnan Laulajat, Finland's premier and most traditional Male Voice Choir. The conductor of Ylioppilaskunnan Laulajat, Pasi Hyökki, is one of the most respected choir conductors in northern Europe.

"I was elated by the Haavisto Campaign and wanted to participate by doing something on my own. In my mind, two very different things started connecting: one of the most traditional methods of communication eg. the male voice choir, and the transformative potential of Pekka Haavisto. For me, the Finlandia Hymn is a story about how a nation leaves behind the dark days and moves forward towards hope." (The main organizer of the choir, Olli Sírén, as quoted in Kämppi & Lähde 2012, pp. 251.)

The video of the flashmob was executed by another Facebook group. People working in the Finnish film and television industry had created the Film-Pekka group, "filmmakers for Pekka Haavisto", originally for creating Youtube ads for the campaign. Members of the film group were introduced to the choir singers, and decided to video the process and edit the performance for publication. They used three cinematographers and multiple sound guys. This represents the overall level of professionalism of the group. Not only were the singers from the best male voice choirs of Finland, one of the core group was a "guerilla-marketing professional", one a cloud-service entrepreneur and third an advertising professional and a founder of the Restaurant Day, a pop-up food carnival that originated in Helsinki. (Youtube-video description of Flashmob Finlandia; Kämppi & Lähde pp. 250-255.)

Siksipekka.fi and kakkonenonykkönen.fi

In Finnish elections, all the candidates are assigned a candidate number at random. During the presidential elections, mr. Haavisto got number two. In Finnish, the connotations and slang usage around the phrase "number two" (numero kakkonen) are different than those in English. Instead of defecation, it refers to anal sex.

The issue of homosexuality was largely absent from the main campaign themes of the official campaign. Since Haavisto was the first openly homosexual presidential candidate, and one of the first openly homosexual politicians in Finland, it became one of the most discussed themes of the election. It was brought up by various media outlets, and it even featured in the ads of Mr. Haavisto's running mate Paavo Väyrynen during the first round of the election. The campaign did not, however, in any way address the subject, other than references to open-mindedness and other liberal values.

A group of marketing and IT professionals, with ties to the official campaign ranging from full-on employment to non-existent, decided to address the issue with humour. Pertti Jarla, the leading provocative humorist cartoonist in Finland, whose syndicated cartoon Fingerpori appears in the leading daily Helsingin Sanomat, promised to produce comic strips for the group.

The strips were built around puns and wordplays referencing homosexuality and male sex and featured mr. Haavisto, his partner and his running mates. The style was very indirect and rather non politically-correct - but the mood always positive and happy. These strips were published in the web page www.kakkonenonykkönen.fi. - the address itself a popular wordplay referencing anal intercourse. The website was among the most popular material of the whole campaign, gaining over 600 000 hits during it's two-week run. (Solid Angle 2012, Kakkonenonykkönen 2012, Siksipekka 2012).

The group running the site came from strong marketing and startup backgrounds. They included some of the very early Finnish internet entrepreneurs, who had started the first Finnish online auction (1999) and the leading social network for teens (2001), that was taken over by Facebook only in 2008. (interview, The Entrepreneur.)

In addition to Kakkonenonykkönen.fi, the group was running siksipekka.fi, a website collecting endorsements for Haavisto from different influential people, and NiksiPekka.fi, which included how-to -guides in guerilla marketing and using the number 2 as symbol. The aim was to create a meme and spread it as wide as possible. (interview, The Entrepreneur.)

"We valued our independence from the official campaign very highly. I think it was a prerequisite for publishing such raucous material as we did. During the days, I was seated next to the Haavisto campaign manager, and I would get the latest strip by email from Jarla. I would

always first publish it in the net and share it on Facebook, and only afterwards show it to the campaign manager. We were very strict about this one." (Interview, the ad executive).

Haavisto plays dubstep

The three previous projects were rather large in scope and professional in nature. The people introduced spend most of January 2012 in these and similar projects. They gathered huge audiences and raised significant amounts of money. This, however, is not the full picture of the spontaneous and independent activity that was the Haavisto campaign. Tens of thousands of people only participated by sharing (or taking) a picture, donating a small sum of money or going to an event. There is also a middle tier: active, creative participation, but on a much smaller scale.

This is a mode of participation made possible by social media. When a single user creates a Youtube video, it can be seen by an unlimited number of people, if it happens to go viral. And even if that doesn't happen on a large scale, it could still have a considerable impact. The Haavisto campaign had several people participating on efforts like this.

Youtube-user TheIsojunno uploaded two videos he had made to the site before the election. In one, Pekka Haavisto plays dubstep (through image manipulation), in other he plays acid trance. Videos are short and mix speeches by Haavisto among the music. They both took less than one evening to make. During 2012, they were seen by 8600 people. (Interveiew, TheIsojunno, Haavisto plays dubstep 2012, Haavisto plays Acid 2012).

TheIsojunno had previously not been politicaly active, and didn't parttake in any other way except through these videos. The Miracle Makers borrowed one of the songs for a radio commercial.

"The Haavisto campaign had a sort of infectious good vibe going that got people to create their own little election advertisements. *Inspired by those, I made mine. I didn't have any grandiose plans, I made them maybe more for the amusement of myself and my friends. I didn't otherwise participate in the campaign and I'm not politically active.*" (interview TheIsojunno.)

6 Discussion

Social media changes the media environment and so political campaigning in the media also needs to change. More distributed media environments call for more distributed campaigns. The Haavisto campaign leveraged social media as a new form of organizing as well as a new media and a way to recruit campaigners.

The main task of the Haavisto campaign was to get a small party candidate who was publicly homosexual to challenge the clear favorite Sauli Niinistö. This goal was achieved, although the campaign did not lead to electoral success: Haavisto lost the election by a clear margin. Niinistö gained more votes in all age groups and all parts of Finland with the exception of the far north of Finland (Rahkonen 2012).

Organizing a campaign in social media

Social media was not only used as one directional media (see Shannon 1948, also Rinne 2011 discussed this in the context of Finland), but as *a means of organizing*: Facebook and social media enable fast non-hierarchic rhizomatic organization among people who do not previously know each other. This leads the diminishing of the power of the central organization. When anyone can found their own Haavisto-group, create events, share it on Facebook and get thousands of spectators, it becomes impossible for the campaign organization to fully control the campaign.

What was new, was that the entire campaign was planned on this. The campaign organization believed from the start that they could not get to the second round by using traditional means. Social media was used to collect funds, recruit campaigners, and motivate those that had already signed on to the campaign. The campaign also benefited from data from net advertising and from freely available internet sources. For example when Google searches increased in the different parts of the country, the campaign headquarters noted that the campaign was growing national.

It is necessary to try control the message of the campaign even in this kind of setting. The campaign headquarters focused to create as simple core message as possible that would endure changes in the hands of meme creators of social media. The strength of the campaign is that most if not all the material that gained visibility was made according to good taste and supported the main positive message. No doubt other kinds of material was also produced, but did not gain

such visibility. This was also a good advice to general campaigning: the message needs to endure changes and maintain the core message.

The strength of existing networks may explain why the Haavisto campaign was successful in maintaining its core message. Many of the active members of support groups knew those who worked in the original campaign or had worked with Haavisto before. Ready networks, like the well-known choir Ylioppilaskunnan Laulajat, served a support function in the organizing.

New campaigners

A campaign that is mostly conducted via social media, need new kinds of campaigners. If traditional electoral campaigns have relied on canvassers, cold-callers and other forms of labor-intensive, but creatively limited volunteering, the situation is completely reversed in social media -intensive campaigns. Because of their viral nature, more emphasis is laid on the creativity and spreadability of the produced material. Instead of party loyalty and free time, the most important attributes of campaigners are technical skills, creativity and connectedness.

We call these the prosumer campaigners: they are valuable, because they possess technical and creative skills needed to conduct viral campaigns on internet platforms. These campaigners are often advertising and media professionals. We claim that these kind of campaigners are willing to volunteer on radically crowdsourced campaigns, because they are able to reflexively take part in the campaign through a project that they feel ownership over. They can also emphasize political themes relevant to themselves. An electoral campaign provides a sense of greater purpose for campaigning and a floating signifier, such as the candidate, gives a set of common tropes to play with.

A new division of labour may explain the success of the Haavisto campaign in addition to the networking enabled by social media. When the campaign office has reduced its control, developments in information and communications technologies enable professionals to take part and invest in the production of campaign material. In this setting, it is easy to participate in the campaign, because there is no need to go through the official campaign. Anyone can take part in the campaign through their own projects.

The totality of the Haavisto campaign (campaign headquarters, party headquarters, and tens of independent projects), could be described as agile network party. It is characteristic for this kind

of actor that it has no hierarchical leadership and its scope cannot be be specifically determined. Its members are all those who take active part in the campaigning as well as those who loaned their identities and powers of persuasion to the campaign's use by posting and sharing in social media. In this kind of organization, you can join with just one click.

A lack of hierarchy does not mean lack of power or that all campaigners would be equal.

Both the campaign headquarters and the party headquarters have their own internal power structures, as do most of the independent campaign projects. Conflicts among these institutions can take place, since they might have different interests. However, it is essential that no institution has the ultimate power over other campaign actors.

References

Alexander, J 2010, *The Performance of Politics,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, NY.

BarackObama.com 2013, www.barackobama.com (Accessed 15.5.2013).

Blumler, J & Kavanagh, D 1999, The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features. *Political Communication* vol. 16, no3, pp. 209-230.

Borg, S 2009, Internet ja sosiaalinen media Suomen EU-vaaleissa 2009. Available at: http://yle.fi/tvuutiset/uutiset/upics/liitetiedostot/internet_ja_sosiaalinen_media_euvaaleissa.pdf Accessed 1.9.2014.

Borg, S 2011. Kansallinen vaalitutkimus Suomessa. *Politiikka* vol. 53, no 1, pp.71-78.

Carpentier, N 2007, Theoretical frameworks for participatory media. *Media technologies and democracy in an enlarged Europe*, pp. 105-122.

Dahlgren, P 2005, The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation. *Political Communication*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 147–162.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F 1987, Introduction: rhizome. *A thousand plateaus* (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Duverger, M 1967, *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (3ed),* Methuen&Co LTD, London.

Eisenhardt, K 1989, Building theories from case study research, *Academy of Management Review,* vol. 14, no.4, pp. 352-550.

Epstein, L 1979, *Political parties in Western democracies,* Transaction, New Jersey.

Federal Election Commission 2013, 2012 Presidential Campaign Finance, http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do (accessed 1.9.2014)

Flashmob Finlandia 2012, Youtube video, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wO63xt2jWtc (Accessed 1.9.2014)

Foot, K A 2006, Web Sphere Analysis and Cybercultural Studies, in D. Silver & A. Massanari (Eds.), *Critical Cyberculture Studies: Current Terrains, Future Directions*, New York University, New York, NY.

Gibson, R & Römmele, A 2009, Measuring the Professionalization of Political Campaigning, *Party Politics* vol. 15, no. 3, pp.321-339.

Gibson, R, Gillan, K, Greffet, F, Lee, BJ, & Ward, S, 2013, Party organizational change and ICTs: The growth of a virtual grassroots? *New Media & Society* vol. 15, no.1, pp. 31-51.

Haavisto campaign website 2012, www.haavisto2012.fi (Accessed 1.9.2014)

Haavisto plays Acid 2012, A Youtube video, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjbbGXwug1k (Accessed 15.5.2013)

Haavisto plays Dubstep, A youtube video, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3MXl62SM9A (Accessed 15.5.2013)

Hindman, M 2005, The real lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the first digital campaign, *Perspectives on Politics* vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 121-28.

Häyhtiö, T & Rinne, J 2007, Satunnaisesta poliitikosta refleksiiviseksi toimijaksi - Poliittisen osallistumisen muutoksesta, *Politiikka* vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 76–91.

Ihmeidentekijät 2012, A youtube movie, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvIhA7iBtVM (accessed 15.5.2013)

Isomäki, H, Lappi T-R & Silvennoinen, J 2013. Verkon etnografinen tutkimus. In SM Laaksonen,
J Matikainen & M Tikka (eds) *Otteita verkosta. Verkon ja sosiaalisen median
tutkimusmenetelmät,* Osuuskunta Vastapaino, Tampere.

Johnson, TJ & Perlmutter DD 2010, Introduction: The Facebook Election, *Mass Communication
and Society*, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 554-559.

Kakkonenonykkönen 2012, www.kakkonenonykkonen.fi (accessed 1.9.2014)

Kreiss, D 2012, *Taking Our Country Back. The Crafting of Networked Politics from Howard
Dean to Barack Obama*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.

Kämppi, R & Lähde, J 2012, *Sydänten presidentti*. Helsinki-kirjat, Helsinki.

Laclau, E, & Mouffe, C 1985, *Hegemony and social strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics*,Verso, London, New York.

Lehtopelto, J 2012, Vaalikampanja sosiaalisessa mediassa. Avalaible at
http://www.slideshare.net/n2socialmediahub/pekka-haaviston-kampanja-sosiaalisessa-mediassa
(Accessed 15.5.2013)

Mancini, P 1999, New frontiers in political professionalism. *Political Communication*, vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 231-245.

(Finnish) Ministry of Justice 2012, Electoral funding records for 2012 presidential elections,
available at
http://www.vaalirahoitus.fi/fi/index/vaalirahailmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/PV2012.html.
(Accessed 1.9.2014).

Moring, T & Mykkänen, J 2012, Vaalikampanjat ja viestinnällistyminen, In *Muutosvaalit 2011*,
Sami Borg (ed), Oikeusministeriön selvityksiä ja ohjeita 16/2012.

Moring, T, Mykkänen, J, Nord, L & Grusell, M 2011, Campaign Professionalization and
Political Structures: A Comparative Study of Election Campaignin in Finland and Sweden in the

2009 EP Elections. In Maier, M, Strömbäck, J & Kaid LK (eds), *Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections,* Ashgate Publishing, Surrey, Lontoo.

Negrine, R 2007, The Professionalization of Political Communication in Europe. In Negrine, R, Mancini, P, Holtz-Bacha, C, Papathanassopoulos, S (eds.), *The Professionalisation of Political Communication,* Intellect, Bristol.

Parviainen, O, Poutanen, P, Laaksonen, S-M & Rekola, M 2012. Measuring the effect of social connections on political activity on Facebook. Internet, Politics, Policy 2012: Big Data, Big Challenges Oxford, UK, Sep 20 available at: http://ipp.oii.ox.ac.uk/sites/ipp.oii.ox.ac.uk/files/documents/parviainen_poutanen_laaksonen_rek ola_measuring_the_effect_of_social_connections_on_political_activity_on_facebook_v2.pdf

Rahkonen, J 2012, Suurten ikäluokkien presidentti? Niinistö-ilmiön voimakkuus eri sukupolvissa. *Yhteiskuntapolitiikka* vol. 77, no. 3.

Raunio, T 2004, The changing Finnish democracy: Stronger parliamentary accountability, coalescing political parties and weaker external constraints, *Scandinavian Political Studies* vol 27, no. 2, pp. 133-152.

Rinne, J, 2011, Vaalikampanja sosiaalisessa mediassa. *Politiikka* vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 63–70.

Schneider, SM & Foot, KA, 2005, Web Sphere Analysis: An Approach to Studying Online Action, In C. Hine (Ed.), *Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet.* Berg Publishers, Oxford.

Schneider, SM & Foot, KA, 2004 The Web as an Object of Study, *New Media and Society*, vol. 6, no.1, pp. 114-122.

Shannon, CE, 1948, A mathematical theory of communication, *The Bell System Technical Journal* 27.

Siksipekka, 2012, www.Siksipekka.fi/mita (Accessed 15.5.2013)

Solid Angle 2012, http://solidangle.fi/haavisto2012 (accessed 1.9.2014)

Strandberg, K 2009, On-line Campaigning – An Opening for the Outsiders? An Analysis of the Finnish Parliamentary Candidates' Websites in the 2003 Election Campaign, *New Media & Society* vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 835-854.

Strandberg, K, 2012, Sosiaalisen median vallankumous? Ehdokkaat, valitsijat ja sosiaalinen media vuoden 2011 eduskuntavaaleissa, in *Muutosvaalit 2011,* Borg, S (ed). Oikeusministeriön selvityksiä ja ohjeita 16/2012.

Strandberg, K 2013, A social media revolution or just a case of history repeating itself? The use of social media in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections, *New Media & Society*, vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 1329-1347.

Vergeer, M 2012, Politics, elections and online campaigning: Past, present ... and a peek into the future, *New Media & Society,* vol. 15, no. 9, pp. 9-17.

Yin, Robert. 1984. *Case study research: Design and methods.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.